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Abstract

A historiographical consensus exists on the failure of Admiral von Tirpitz’s Risk Theory to produce its expected deterrence effect and deliver its promise of sea power. To explain the reasons for its downfall, historians have mainly highlighted inherent contradictions and strategic flaws in the conceptual construction of the Risk Theory. This paper argues that the study of the Risk Theory’s failure should go beyond the analysis of the theory itself and include the examination of the British reactions to evaluate their impact on the plan.

This paper reinterprets the collapse of the Risk Theory by placing the British counteractions in the pre-World War I years at the centre of the reasons explaining its downfall. By contrasting Tirpitz’s strategy with the effects of the overwhelming British response, this paper provides a different prism to evaluate the plan’s failure in a broader
context of confrontation against Britain. It concludes that Britain identified and effectively addressed the threats posed by the Risk Theory by improving the Royal Navy and enhancing British naval strategy in the years leading to World War I. The result of these actions was the major cause of the ruin of the Risk Theory.

Course: Naval History - MA - C2457P

Date Deposited: 2024-02-05

URI/permalink: https://library.port.ac.uk/dissert/dis14362.html